• MartianSands@sh.itjust.works
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    1 year ago

    Because a container is only as isolated from the host as you want it to be.

    Suppose you run a container and mount the entire filesystem into it. If that container is running as root, it can then read and write anything it likes (including password databases and /etc/sudo)

    • lemmyvore@feddit.nl
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      1 year ago

      So what? If I mount / in the container and choose to run it as root that’s my business. Why would the containerization engine second-guess what I’m doing?

      How would you like it if sudo told you “I can’t let you be root, you could read and write anything you like, including password databases and /etc/sudo”?

      • IAm_A_Complete_Idiot@sh.itjust.works
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        1 year ago

        The point is to minimize privilege to the least possible - not to make it impossible to create higher privileged containers. If a container doesn’t need to get direct raw hardware access, manage low ports on the host network, etc. then why should I give it root and let it be able to do those things? Mapping it to a user, controlling what resources it has access to, and restricting it’s capabilities means that in the event that my container gets compromised, my entire host isn’t necessarily screwed.

        We’re not saying “sudo shouldn’t be able to run as root” but that “by default things shouldn’t be run with sudo - and you need a compelling reason to swap over when you do”