Today’s most advanced AI models have many flaws, but decades from now, they will be recognized as the first true examples of artificial general intelligence.
Actually a really interesting article which makes me rethink my position somewhat. I guess I’ve unintentionally been promoting LLMs as AGI since GPT-3.5 - the problem is just with our definitions and how loose they are. People hear “AGI” and assume it would look and act like an AI in a movie, but if we break down the phrase, what is general intelligence if not applicability to most domains?
This very moment I’m working on a library for creating “semantic functions”, which lets you easily use an LLM almost like a semantic processor. You say await infer(f"List the names in this text: {text}") and it just does it. What most of the hype has ignored with LLMs is that they are not chatbots. They are causal autoregressive models of the joint probabilities of how language evolves over time, which is to say they can be used to build chatbots, but that’s the first and least interesting application.
So yeah, I guess it’s been AGI this whole time and I just didn’t realize it because they aren’t people, and I had assumed AGI implied personhood (which it doesn’t).
I’m not sure how the tech is progressing, but ChatGPT was completely dysfunctional as an expert system, if the AI field still cares about those. You can adapt the Chinese Room problem to whether a model actually has applicability outside of a particular domain (say, anything requiring guessing words on probabilities, or stabilising a robot).
Another problem is that probabilistic reasoning requires data. Just because a particular problem solving approach is very good at guessing words based on a huge amount of data from a generalist corpus, doesn’t mean it’s good at guessing in areas where data is poor. Could you comment on whether LLMs have good applicability as expert systems in, say, medicine? Especially obscure diseases, or heterogeneous neurological conditions (or both like in bipolar disorders and schizophrenia-related disorders)?
LLMs are not expert systems, unless you characterize them as expert systems in language which is fair enough. My point is that they’re applicable to a wide variety of tasks which makes them general intelligences, as opposed to an expert system which by definition can only do a handful of tasks.
If you wanted to use an LLM as an expert system (I guess in the sense of an “expert” in that task, rather than a system which literally can’t do anything else), I would say they currently struggle with that. Bare foundation models don’t seem to have the sort of self-awareness or metacognitive capabilities that would be required to restrain them to their given task, and arguably never will because they necessarily can only “think” on one “level”, which is the predicted text. To get that sort of ability you need cognitive architectures, of which chatbot implementations like ChatGPT are a very simple version of. If you want to learn more about what I mean, the most promising idea I’ve seen is the ACE framework. Frameworks like this can allow the system to automatically look up an obscure disease based on the embedded distance to a particular query, so even if you give it a disease which only appears in the literature after its training cut-off date, it knows this disease exists (and is a likely candidate) by virtue of it appearing in its prompt. Something like “You are an expert in diseases yadda yadda. The symptoms of the patient are x y z. This reminds you of these diseases: X (symptoms 1), Y (symptoms 2), etc. What is your diagnosis?” Then you could feed the answer of this question to a critical prompting, and repeat until it reports no issues with the diagnosis. You can even make it “learn” by using LoRA, or keep notes it writes to itself.
As for poorer data distributions, the magic of large language models (before which we just had “language models”) is that we’ve found that the larger we make them, and the more (high quality) data we feed them, the more intelligent and general they become. For instance, training them on multiple languages other than English somehow allows them to make more robust generalizations even just within English. There are a few papers I can recall which talk about a “phase transition” which happens during training where beforehand, the model seems to be literally memorizing its corpus, and afterwards (to anthropomorphize a bit) it suddenly “gets” it and that memorization is compressed into generalized understanding. This is why LLMs are applicable to more than just what they’ve been taught - you can eg give them rules to follow within the conversation which they’ve never seen before, and they are able to maintain that higher-order abstraction because of that rich generalization. This is also a major reason open source models, particularly quantizations and distillations, are so successful; the models they’re based on did the hard work of extracting higher-order semantic/geometric relations, and now making the model smaller has minimal impact on performance.
Actually a really interesting article which makes me rethink my position somewhat. I guess I’ve unintentionally been promoting LLMs as AGI since GPT-3.5 - the problem is just with our definitions and how loose they are. People hear “AGI” and assume it would look and act like an AI in a movie, but if we break down the phrase, what is general intelligence if not applicability to most domains?
This very moment I’m working on a library for creating “semantic functions”, which lets you easily use an LLM almost like a semantic processor. You say
await infer(f"List the names in this text: {text}")and it just does it. What most of the hype has ignored with LLMs is that they are not chatbots. They are causal autoregressive models of the joint probabilities of how language evolves over time, which is to say they can be used to build chatbots, but that’s the first and least interesting application.So yeah, I guess it’s been AGI this whole time and I just didn’t realize it because they aren’t people, and I had assumed AGI implied personhood (which it doesn’t).
I’m not sure how the tech is progressing, but ChatGPT was completely dysfunctional as an expert system, if the AI field still cares about those. You can adapt the Chinese Room problem to whether a model actually has applicability outside of a particular domain (say, anything requiring guessing words on probabilities, or stabilising a robot).
Another problem is that probabilistic reasoning requires data. Just because a particular problem solving approach is very good at guessing words based on a huge amount of data from a generalist corpus, doesn’t mean it’s good at guessing in areas where data is poor. Could you comment on whether LLMs have good applicability as expert systems in, say, medicine? Especially obscure diseases, or heterogeneous neurological conditions (or both like in bipolar disorders and schizophrenia-related disorders)?
LLMs are not expert systems, unless you characterize them as expert systems in language which is fair enough. My point is that they’re applicable to a wide variety of tasks which makes them general intelligences, as opposed to an expert system which by definition can only do a handful of tasks.
If you wanted to use an LLM as an expert system (I guess in the sense of an “expert” in that task, rather than a system which literally can’t do anything else), I would say they currently struggle with that. Bare foundation models don’t seem to have the sort of self-awareness or metacognitive capabilities that would be required to restrain them to their given task, and arguably never will because they necessarily can only “think” on one “level”, which is the predicted text. To get that sort of ability you need cognitive architectures, of which chatbot implementations like ChatGPT are a very simple version of. If you want to learn more about what I mean, the most promising idea I’ve seen is the ACE framework. Frameworks like this can allow the system to automatically look up an obscure disease based on the embedded distance to a particular query, so even if you give it a disease which only appears in the literature after its training cut-off date, it knows this disease exists (and is a likely candidate) by virtue of it appearing in its prompt. Something like “You are an expert in diseases yadda yadda. The symptoms of the patient are x y z. This reminds you of these diseases: X (symptoms 1), Y (symptoms 2), etc. What is your diagnosis?” Then you could feed the answer of this question to a critical prompting, and repeat until it reports no issues with the diagnosis. You can even make it “learn” by using LoRA, or keep notes it writes to itself.
As for poorer data distributions, the magic of large language models (before which we just had “language models”) is that we’ve found that the larger we make them, and the more (high quality) data we feed them, the more intelligent and general they become. For instance, training them on multiple languages other than English somehow allows them to make more robust generalizations even just within English. There are a few papers I can recall which talk about a “phase transition” which happens during training where beforehand, the model seems to be literally memorizing its corpus, and afterwards (to anthropomorphize a bit) it suddenly “gets” it and that memorization is compressed into generalized understanding. This is why LLMs are applicable to more than just what they’ve been taught - you can eg give them rules to follow within the conversation which they’ve never seen before, and they are able to maintain that higher-order abstraction because of that rich generalization. This is also a major reason open source models, particularly quantizations and distillations, are so successful; the models they’re based on did the hard work of extracting higher-order semantic/geometric relations, and now making the model smaller has minimal impact on performance.