- Russia’s gas giant Gazprom won’t recover gas sales lost to the Ukraine war for at least a decade.
- A study seen by the Financial Times says pre-war export volumes will return by 2035.
- Gazprom will likely lose its leading role in Russia’s energy sector over time.
Is this a surprise? Unlike oil, gas is extremely hard to transport. China’s playing hard to get with PoS 2 because the renewable transition is hitting much faster than anticipated (China is hitting their fossil fuels consumption and emissions targets years in advance)… And China doesn’t see natural gas outside of PoS 1 and domestic production as a significant part of the energy mix in the future. They skipped the whole coal -> natural gas step.
Meanwhile, crossing the multiple borders to get to India would be a rather complex undertaking, and Nordstream got blown up so European revenues will be suppressed indefinitely even if the war ends (convenient, that).
Given no export target, most natural gas will have to be flared off in the process of oil production… Bad for the environment, but unavoidable given the lack of Nordstream.
Russian oil revenues are high, though, and the domestic surplus of energy has given Russian industry a kick in the butt, so the real losers in this are Germany and Europe, which have seen their industrial bases decimated.
Really? Is the source the same people whose Coronavirus estimates increased suspiciously geometrical rather than exponential?
Is that a surprise? Coronavirus cases around the world were limited by reporting capability. In the US, many cases were left entirely unreported because of political reasons.
China hit the peak early and only reported cases that could be tested and verified as being COVID. Thus, geometric scaling in an exponential world.
That, or China’s extreme lockdowns actually did something to transmission behaviours by tuning down R0. You decide.
My mistake. They weren’t supposed to be estimates, they were supposed to be actual figures, and rather than say “we haven’t collected enough data” or “we don’t want to give out the actual data” the decision was made to use an outdated extrapolation measure and which was then reported as fact, or if you prefer, allowed to be interpreted as fact.
That’s why I was sceptical.
But another comment suggests that China might actually be struggling, and it’s that which is the cause of the downturn in usage.
I’d rather it wasn’t that. Recessions suck and it’s the wrong people (regular citizens) who suffer.
China was always clear about how they collected their data (admittedly, moreso to the Chinese-speaking audience where they actually described this). Again, the limitations of lack of testing were very pronounced around the world at the start of the pandemic and sticking to verified cases was the only actual data available. R0 was still an open question: how would you have wanted an estimate to be made?
According to the IEA, China’s coal demand will peak in 2024.
Sinopec only claims coal peaking in 2025.
Sinopec also claims peak oil happened in 2023.
Moreover, that peak gasoline has already passed due to the EV transition.
According to CREA, China’s emissions are set to fall in 2024.
The Washington Post corroborated this general message, even if it did not give an exact date.
Even intuitively, this makes sense: emissions growth are tied to economic growth (particularly in construction), so if the construction sector is in structural decline then emissions should decline with it. If the economy is not growing, then emissions should fall. If the mix of primary energy sources pivots towards renewables, emissions should fall.
This is entirely independent from whether the capacity exists: you can study this entirely from the demand-side because everyone knows renewables are the most cost-effective option on the supply-side.